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Abstract 
Wearable embedded devices are in common use in the medical industry. In today’s 
society security is needed in just about every electronic device. However, these devices don't yet 
have many security standards. To prevent scenarios that involve unauthorized sources intruding 
on a device, a honeypot could be used as a secure lightweight (in terms of resource usage) 
addition to these medical devices. Honeypots typically have a monitoring component, this allows 
a system designer to gain knowledge of exploits which can then be patched. This project seeks to 
devise and implement a wearable honeypot to add security to a BAN (Body Area Network).  
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1 Introduction 
In this modern information age, wearable embedded devices (small sensors with 
microcontrollers equipped with wireless communication) have become common use in the 
medical industry [10]. More recently a consumer market has developed for these kinds of 
devices [9]. Wearable embedded devices connected to a base station form a piconet (small 
network) called a BAN (Body Area Network AKA Body Sensor Network). Currently, most 
implementaions of BANs are used by the medical industry because by attaching multiple sensors 
to someone, different medical stats can be gathered and then analyzed by a doctor in the 
treatment of a patient [1]. With the advent of products such as the Apple Watch, BANs are 
moving into broader consumer use. With small sensors, the user can usually maintain a normal 
lifestyle even with all the monitoring. A BAN is shown below in Figure 1. 
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 3
Node 5
base station
 
Figure 1: Wireless BAN 
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Our work is built on a Bluetooth-based BAN system built on the Shimmer platform, and 
utilizes a BAN-PnP application-layer protocol [19]. The BAN has a basestation implemented as 
an Android app; the motes (node on sensor network) on the sensor network are Shimmer motes 
[1]. The BAN itself already provides a measurable hit to the performance of the motes [1]. This 
illustrates the need for lightweight security protocols. This BAN is ideal for our purposes as it is 
cross platform. It only requires a device to implement the BAN protocol on top of Bluetooth. 
Most importantly this BAN is plug 'n play and base station firmware does not need to be updated 
to accommodate new motes with previously unknown functionality [1]. Generally, these wireless 
devices are short ranged, however this does not shield users from attackers. 
Today security is needed in just about every electronic device, however BAN devices 
don't yet have many security standards. To prevent unauthorized sources from intruding on a 
device, a honeypot could be used as a lightweight addition to these medical devices. Honeypots 
typically have a monitoring component. This allows a system designer to log and recreate 
exploits so that they can be patched [15]. Most of the time, when no threats are present, the 
honeypot requires little computation and therefore doesn’t use much battery power. Additionally, 
when a threat is detected heavier weight security measures (i.e. thorough packet sniffing and 
analysis) can be activated [14]. These heavier weight security measures would produce a 
significant drain on battery power if they were always active. This project seeks to devise and 
implement a wearable honeypot to add security to a BAN. Previous honeypots are mostly used in 
enterprise environments. Recently, there have been groups working on mobile honeypots, which 
are essentially mobile versions of enterprise honeypots. Our honeypot will be a new application, 
however many design principles will remain the same as traditional honeypots. 
 In the honeypot for the sensor motes the Shimmer Platform will be used. For the motes 
TinyOS is used "because it’s been around so long, the code has been well tested, and a strong 
community has had the time to build up. With a better community comes better support and by 
extension an easier time solving problems that will arise in development” [1]. For the base 
station we are using an app on an Android based phone as this would likely be an item a patient 
needing a BAN might have.  
2 Background 
 To understand this project, a basic understanding of Bluetooth and honeypots is required. 
Bluetooth is used as the means of communication within a BAN and operates at similar 
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frequencies to Wi-Fi [27]. This project aims to design a honeypot to detect attacks on a BAN, 
which can be used to improve the security of the BAN. 
2.1 Bluetooth 
Bluetooth is a peer to peer communication protocol over a short range broadcast medium. 
In a Bluetooth piconet there is one master and up to 7 slaves. The master initiates activities and 
slaves respond to the master. To add a slave to the piconet a master must initiate pairing with a 
slave. When communicating, the master hops between 7 channels and the slaves hop between 
another 7 channels to send packets. Bluetooth operates in the 2.4-2.485 GHz data range [26]. 
Like TCP/IP, it has a stack to abstract out the hardware from the application programmer. 
Bluetooth is also widely used, despite known vulnerabilities and demonstrated hacks [22]. 
2.2 Honeypots 
A honeypot is best understood as a trap for attackers [14]. A honeypot is a system whose 
main purpose is to be attacked and compromised [5]. They monitor what goes in and what goes 
out of a system and are isolated, sometimes even running on a separate device. Some honeypots 
act as a decoy server that tries to compromise the attack and make themselves easy targets [16]. 
Honeypots can log all the incoming and outgoing packets so any vulnerability can be looked 
back on and analyzed for future study. There are scenarios where multiple different honeypots 
are used within a system. This is referred to as a honeynet [13]. 
There are many advantages to a honeypot.  One advantage is that a honeypot can record 
illegitimate activity. They are usually encrypted environments, and don’t require known attack 
signatures [15]. But like all things, the honeypot has some disadvantages too. For instance, there 
are some types of honeypots that can be used to attack other systems. Also, a honeypot cannot 
detect if other systems are being attacked. It only knows what is going in and out of its own 
system. A honeypot may also be detected by the attacker.  
2.2.1 Honeypot Classification 
While there are different applications and implementations of honeypots, they fall into a 
couple archetypes based upon purpose and implementation. Usually they’re either passive or 
active. Passive honeypots collect data for analysis so exploits can become known and patched. 
Active honeypots detect threats and then do something in response. Honeypots are usually high 
interaction or low interaction. Low interaction honeypots recreate small subsets of a system, are 
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generally simple, and not resource intensive. High interaction honeypots recreate entire 
subsystems resulting in higher security at the expense of maintenance costs. The extreme case of 
a high interaction honeypot would be a pure honeypot. In a pure honeypot the entire system is a 
honeypot, not a mix of simulated subsystems. In terms of purpose, there are two main types of 
classification, enterprise and research honeypots. Research honeypots are typically passive 
honeypots that collect extensive information about hacks and exploits and are generally used for 
research, hence the name. The other kind is an enterprise honeypot. Typically enterprise 
honeypots are low interaction, or made with multiple low interaction implementations. This is 
for practicality purposes because they are easier to deploy and maintain. After all they are made 
for production environments.  
 
3 Related Works 
Examples of enterprise Honeypots are Google Honeypot, Honeyd, Homemade honeypot, 
ManTrap and BackOfficer Friendly [13]. The following infographic in Figure 6 visualizes our 
taxonomy and classification of well-known honeypots and the mobile honeypots discussed in 
Figure 2. Some of the mobile honeypots are in the early stages of design and therefore we 
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couldn’t thoroughly classify all of them... 
  
Figure 2: Classification of Honeypots 
3.1 HoneyDroid 
One example of a mobile honeypot is the HoneyDroid [5]. This honeypot system deals 
with 4 challenges: monitoring, audit logging, containment and visibility. The monitoring issue 
involved how to monitor everything occurring in the system without causing the OS to be easily 
compromised [5]. The goal in monitoring is to have a system that can monitor everything such 
that they can recreate the exact event. The audit logging issue is about creating a secure, reliable 
storage compartment of all the logs. In containment, the honeypot has to be designed such that 
the attacker is able to easily stumble into it but becomes trapped in the honeypot and isn’t able to 
make any further attacks [5]. The issue with visibility is that the honeypot needs to be exposed 
enough so that the attacker can attack it, but not so visible that it's obvious and easy to get around 
[5]. The design of the HoneyDroid is shown below in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3: Design of HoneyDroid 
In this diagram the Event Monitor is placed in between the Android OS and Android’s 
own form of Event Monitor that monitors calls and signals. In HoneyDroid the Android OS is 
not able to have direct access to the hardware. Instead, HoneyDroid virtualizes everything thus 
allowing everything to be monitored. This also allows them to take snapshots of the system. In 
this system, the Android OS has no access to the snapshots either; the virtual modem is used to 
fight against malware, leading to the containment functionality [5]. 
The log component receives information from different areas of the system. These logs 
ensure integrity through time stamps. [5]. For visibility, this honeypot is given a public IP 
address. It is planned for HoneyDroid to have automatic installation and execution privileges, 
and give the honeypot access to the internet and allow the honeypot to spread the google account 
name associated with the honeypot. [5]. 
 HoneyDroid seems to be a great system to reference our honeypot. Monitoring, audit 
logging, containment and visibility are key components needed for our specific system. 
Specifications of where certain components are stationed may alter however the idea of time 
stamping all components that enter and leave the honeypot, the ability to snapshot system 
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activities and  the honeypot given a public IP all seems promising for our honeypot system. 
However, while this honeypot contains many useful properties, it simply doesn't provide security 
to Bluetooth. 
3.2 HoneyDroid Extension 
Extending from the HoneyDroid, lack of behavioral considerations and existing security 
policy on the mobile device platform became additional challenges. The lack of behavioral 
considerations means mobile users desire to give up security in return for free access to 
applications. This means it’s hard to take into account user actions such as rooting their phones 
or installing malicious applications. The second challenge involved how certain Android 
functions limited the honeypot functionality. These Android functions include things that are 
able to bypass the Android security such as SMS and MMS [4].  Figure 4 bellow illustrates the 
framework for this mobile honeypot. 
 
Figure 4: HoneyDroid Extension 
In this scenario, this mobile honeypot is intended for threats coming from data networks 
that are connected telecommunication cells [4]. The connection for the smart mobile honeypots 
comes through from telecommunication stations, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.  The smart mobile 
honeypots have 2 states: state 1 records data and connects to web server to send this data; state 2 
involves threat monitoring, audit logging, containment and modeling functionalities.  
State 1 has a honeypot that communicates with other honeypots.  Specifically when data 
is being sent from the device, it goes through a honeypot which communicates with other servers 
with honeypots. Then when data is being sent back the honeypot records everything coming in 
[4].  State 2 is a software implementation of threat monitoring, audit logging, containment and 
user’s behavioral logging requirements. Thread monitoring is responsible for monitoring data 
packets going in and out of the system. When a threat is detected, it will gather data focused 
around that attack. The audit logging will be a copy of the gathered data and will be backed up 
on another server.  For containment, the honeypot will isolate the attack and not let it continue on 
through the network. If there was an occurrence of a fast speeding threat, the mobile device will 
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be cut off from the network.  Another module called User Behavioral Module will be monitoring 
and tracking the user’s patterns [4].  
The additions to the HoneyDroid seem plausible. However, for the BAN honeypot it is 
assumed the user is not interested in lowering its security and rooting their Android device.  
Communicating with other honeypot devices for stronger security is also not in the scope of this 
project. This idea may be used for future works but is not useful for the design of our BAN 
honeypot. 
3.3 Mobile Honeynet 
The implementation of Mobile Honeynet was based on 3 main questions:  
1) Is it necessary that the probe runs on a mobile device 
2) Is it necessary that the honeypot runs on a mobile OS 
3) To which network is the mobile honeypot connected 
This system made the assumption that there is no need to have a mobile honeypot on a 
smartphone [7]. Instead a Linux operating system was used for 2 reasons. One, most 
smartphones use Android OS and, two, it allows you to reuse existing honeypot tools. [7]. To 
answer the third question, the mobile probe should connect to a real mobile network. If not, there 
is a chance the attacker can detect differences.  
The implementation of this mobile honeypot consisted of three other honeypots: Kippo, 
Glastopf and Dionaea. Kippo is an SSH honeypot that has a trivial password. This allows the 
attacker to gain access into the system. The attacker is given administrator privileges where the 
attacker can execute common programs, download and install anything else they wanted. In the 
background the honeypot records everything and uses it later for analysis. To prevent more 
problems for the honeypot, executing newly installed programmers are prohibited. 
The second honeypot, Glastopf provides uploads to web-based servers. This honeypot 
monitors and watches this upload and logs everything that comes in and out of this uploaded file. 
And finally, Dionaea is a honeypot that monitors all transport ports. 
For our BAN honeypot, this honeynet system cannot be referenced. This honeynet system 
regards the fact a mobile honeypot is needed and attempts to utilize other manufactured 
honeypots. When implementing our own honeypot other manufactured honeypots cannot be 
used. 
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3.4 Mobile Communication Honeypot 
The final system had an interesting way of implementing their mobile honeypot.  The 
design is shown below in Figure 5. [7] 
                  
 
Figure 5: Mobile Communication Honeypot 
As this figure shows the honeypot is broken down into four layers: access, networking 
simulating wireless environment, data transmission, data analysis and system supervisor. Within 
these layers mobile communication terminals, wireless link access module, data transmission 
module and application processing center module [7]. 
 This communication honeypot cannot be referenced when designing our BAN honeypot. 
Even though this system is plausible, our BAN communicates through Bluetooth and does not 
require the Internet. 
4 Problem Statement 
The challenge of this project is to develop an effective honeypot that doesn't greatly 
diminish the performance of the devices in a BAN. Meanwhile it still must monitor effectively 
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enough to detect attacks on the BAN. Just running the BAN protocol has already affected mote 
battery life [1]. The high level design goals of the Honeypot were as follows: 
• Obvious enough to be an attack target, but not obviously a honeypot.  
• Easily comprisable without allowing the BAN to be compromised.   
• Effectively detects attacks 
• Extensive logging with timestamps so attacks can be reconstructed from logs.  
• Shouldn’t be a large burden on the power requirements of the embedded sensors. 
 
5 Motivations 
Mobile honeypots are a new field and BAN honeypots don't yet exist. The basic 
motivation behind this project is that wearable embedded devices do not have much security 
[17]. Wearable embedded devices include modern pacemakers. Thus one of the chief 
motivations of this project is to make these devices safe to use [14]. Wearable embedded devices 
also have strict battery requirements meaning that any security measures would have to be 
lightweight. In a passive state a honeypot doesn’t necessarily require a lot of computational 
overhead. To make these devices safe in a practical way, the flexibility of a honeypot is 
desirable; standard cryptographic routines are not desirable because they are computationally 
expensive. Finally, there is a need to secure vital wearable embedded devices to be safe to use 
and this will take more than just implementing standard security. 
 
6 System Model 
6.1 BAN 
The system we are using is a plug and play BAN protocol. The BAN consists of a base 
station (BS) and sensor nodes or motes. The BAN was designed as a link layer protocol with 
these properties: 
• Does not inherently rely on static message identifiers,  
• Supports new sensors, motes, and commands without changes to the mote 
firmware or base station application  
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• Have a flexible base station learning language that can be expanded easily 
through changes to a few Grammars and  
• Have a BAN platform that is flexible enough to support any type of research or 
real world application.[1] 
In creating this BAN protocol, a platform was needed. For a mobile device, the team 
decided on the Android platform due to its wide usage across many different devices. For a 
sensing platform, they decided on the Shimmer platform. Shimmer is designed specifically for 
wearable applications and is used widely in medical fields. Much of Shimmer’s resources are 
open source, making it useful to the goal of that protocol. 
Shimmer’s sensors are separated into three groups including kinematic sensors, 
biophysical sensors, and ambient sensors. Kinematic sensors record movement (i.e. velocity and 
position), biomedical sensors record medical data (i.e. heart rate and body temperature), and 
ambient sensors measure environmental properties (i.e. temperature and humidity). Shimmer 
comes with the following sensor options: ECG, EMG, GSR, 9DoF, GPS, Strain Gauge, and 
Accelerometer. Shimmer also includes LabView, Matlab, Android, and Windows applications as 
base station platforms [12]. For the OS platform, Shimmer’s motes are TinyOS based. The 
implementers of the BAN used TinyOS because it's a well-used library that's been around for a 
long time and has a large support community [1].  
The protocol itself is very good for generic use. The mote has six states: Idle, 
Discoverable, Paired, Connected, Command & Inquiry and Streaming. The Base station, on the 
other hand has a total of seven states: Idle, Discovery, Paired, Connected, Command & Inquiry, 
Mote Data and Mote Response. As a general summary, the BAN is designed using a state 
machine design pattern. Each state has one action. Some states allow a user to send commands, 
request sensor data, receive sensor data, etc. Doing a different task means transitioning to a 
different state. The protocol specifically forbids doing or requesting an action for a state other 
than the one the mote is currently in [1]. The way this is implemented is through a set of 
functions that allows the base station to ask each mote that connects how to use it. This allows 
the motes to teach the base station all of its functionality. Thus, the base station has no prior 
knowledge of what any of the motes can do. There are only 7 different kinds of messages in the 
BAN protocol, they are detailed in Figure 6: 
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Figure 6: Types of Messages in BAN Protocol 
 This means that the BAN is completely extendable to include different motes without 
updating the base station. The unused message types allow the protocol itself to be extended as 
well. Figure 7 illustrates the communication architecture of the BAN. 
Mote
Normal BAN Communication
Master
Slave
M
ot
e
Slave
M
ote
Slave
 
Figure 7: BAN Wearable Honeypot Overview 
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6.2 Threat Model 
In addition to the protocol there are a few more assumptions. One assumption is that the 
base station user is not the attacker as a BSN can contain important medical devices. The base 
station can only pair with motes when the user initiates pairing. It is assumed that the user will 
not knowingly pair with any attacker. In addition to the system here, we need to make 
assumptions about an attacker. 
There is an assumption that the attacker would have relatively high computational 
abilities – in addition to the computational power of today's high end laptops it is relatively 
cheap and simple to rent out compute time on servers from companies like Amazon. Specifically 
Amazon Web Services has the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), which gives 750 
computing hours on Linux and 750 hours on Windows server free then charges $0.105 (2 Cores 
and 3.75 GiB RAM) to $1.68 an hour (32 cores and 60 GiB RAM) for compute time on compute 
optimized servers [28].  The attacker can also spoof, launch man in the middle attacks, and has 
the knowledge to decrypt encryption. With the short range of Bluetooth, we also assumed only 
one adversary; however that one person can use multiple devices simulating multiple 
adversaries.  
7 Wearable Honeypot 
The Wearable Honeypot system is meant to detect threats to a BSN. The basis for the 
honeypot is a message mode. The message mode involves a message exchange between the BS 
and specialized helper motes. The BS and the motes communicate in a pre-arranged way. This 
message exchange acts as bait for an attacker to pay attention to the helper motes because it is 
the most active part of the BAN. Initially just like with other motes, the base station will ask for 
all information about the motes (sensors, types of data, commands, etc.)  and then enter message 
mode. In this mode the BS periodically sets and resets what the motes are sending to it. The data 
the mote sends back is coordinated and known to the basestation. An attacker spoofing messages 
would cause the expectations of this system to be violated. Using this approach many attacks can 
be detected. The architecture of the honeypot is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Wearable Honeypot Architecture  
 Because a honeypot is meant to detect threats, as a first step in designing the honeypot 
system, a threat model was developed. The threat model was an outline of all possible adversary 
attacks the honeypot will be on the lookout for. By examining the Bluetooth protocol and BAN 
protocol, attacks were devised. This eventually became a honeypot model when corresponding 
detection information was added. However, before that is presented, it is important to understand 
message mode because the honeypot model depends on it. 
7.1 Message Mode 
As mentioned above, the detection mechanisms depend on a message coordination 
scheme. There are two logical communication channels between the helper motes and the base 
station, a high security channel and a low security channel. The high security channel is where 
the message mode is coordinated by the basestation and the low security channel is for “normal” 
BAN PnP communication. This message coordination scheme relies on simultaneously 
synthesizing accelerometer data on the motes and BS, which involves a PRNG (Pseudo-random 
Number Generator). Over the high security channel, the base station sends a coordination 
message which tells the motes which kind of accelerometer data (sitting or walking) to 
synthesize and how many data points to send back to the base station as supposed sensor data for 
accelerometers. This way, the base station can know what messages to expect from motes and 
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when (these stream in and the average rate is monitored for sudden changes). Additionally, once 
a mote receives a coordination message, it should only ever expect more of them and nothing 
else. If a mote receives any other message it will send an encrypted message to the base station 
indicating that an attacker was detected. If the base station receives any packets from helper 
motes before they request data stream to be started, then this also allows attackers to be detected. 
Table 1 presents packet description of the coordination message and an example mote return 
packets. The base station coordination message packet is broken down into two parts: Header 
and Body. The header specifies the packet size, sequence number and Message ID (1111 1110b). 
The body specifies the type and the number of accelerometer values to send as well as initializes 
the PRNG.  The mote packet response also contains a header and body where the header 
specifies packet size, sequence number and message ID while the body specifies Sensor ID and 
message value. 
Table 1: Honeypot Message Mode Specification 
Honeypot Message Mode Specification 
BS Coordination Message Example Mote "DATA" Response Packets 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0001 1000 : packet size 24 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : sequence number 
1111 1110 : message ID  
// Body  
// 10 messages -- array of 10 16 bit values 
0000 0001 : // Type of data, 1 for walking, 0 for sitting  
0000 0010  
1101 0000 : // Number of data points to send 
// 4 32 bit integers to initialize PRNG 
0000 0011  
0100 0111 
0101 0000  
0101 0011 : 1 
0000 0000   
0110 0011 
0111 0111  
0010 1010 : 2 
0011 1001  
0110 0000 
0000 0011  
0110 0100 : 3 
1010 0101 
0111 0111 
0111 1000  
0000 0100 : 4 
// First mote response 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 8 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : sequence number 
0000 0000 : message ID  - mote data 
// Body: 
0000 0001 : Sensor ID 
0110 0011  
0100 0010 : Sensor data payload (message value) 
//  Second mote response 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 8 
0000 0000 
0000 1001 : sequence number 
0000 0000 : message ID  - mote data 
// Body: 
0000 0001 : Sensor ID 
0110 0000 
0000 0011: Sensor data payload (message value) 
 
// Third mote response 
// Header: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 8 
0000 0000 
0000 1010 : sequence number 
0000 0000 : message ID  - mote data 
// Body: 
0000 0001 : Sensor ID 
0100 0111 
0101 0000: Sensor data payload (message value) 
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In a situation where an attacker is detected, the message ID would alter to 1111 1101b and 
transmit this sequence over the secure channel.  
With this communication mechanism, the base station will know when it wasn't a 
honeypot mote that sent the message. Additionally, the attacks themselves depend on a Python 
library called Scapy [24]. Scapy is a packet manipulation program [24]. This Python library 
supports Bluetooth frames and is ideal for our purposes because it makes spoofing simple. The 
encryption of the application packets themselves uses the AES block cipher in the cipher block 
chaining (CBC) mode.  
7.1.1 Synthesizing Accelerometer Data 
For the message mode, we needed to determine a method to send false yet realistic data 
to attract the attacker’s attention yet not make it obviously fake. The idea we set upon was to 
synthesize real sensor data. We settled on accelerometer data as the best option for this endeavor. 
There are many devices with accelerometers and it isn’t abnormal for someone to have more 
than one sensor monitoring accelerometer data. After that, exactly how we synthesize it became 
the next issue. Mathematically synthesizing the data is very computationally intensive, so we 
decided to start with a real data bank of accelerometer values for different activities. 
7.1.1.1 Real Accelerometer Data 
 We found data collected and published for the purpose of activity recognition from 
accelerometer data [29]. The activities were separated, graphed, and the standard deviations were 
calculated in order to understand the data. Our honeypot is kept simple and uses two main 
activities and two more as transitions between them. Walking and sitting are the main activities. 
When transitioning from sitting to walking, one must first stand up from sitting, which we have 
data for; when going from walking to sitting, one must sit down first. These provide a couple 
seconds of realistic transition. There were more activities available (such as lying down, on all 
fours and falling), however these activities that don’t generally happen in public.  The graphs in 
Figure 9 present the data points of the selected four activities.  
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 Figure 9: Original Walking Accelerometer Data 
 Figure 9 shows a fairly consistent data set of walking accelerometer values. Towards the 
end it appears that the user may have been transitioning to another activity because it doesn’t 
match the general pattern in the rest of the data. While calculating the standard deviation these 
values were ignored. 
 
Figure 10: Original Standing Up From Sitting Accelerometer Data 
 Figure 10 shows accelerometer values for standing up from sitting. The data in this 
section is fairly regular between points, however a little past halfway through there is a major 
shift downward for the X and Y. From that point on it is fairly regular again. To accommodate 
for this, the graph was divided in two and two different standard deviations were calculated. 
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 Figure 11: Original Sitting Accelerometer Data 
Figure 11 shows the accelerometer data from sitting. As would be expected it is very regular. 
 
Figure 12: Original Sitting Down Accelerometer Data 
Figure 12 shows the sitting down data. Due to the Y vector presenting a similar problem to 
standing up from sitting down, all vectors were divided in two and two separate calculations 
were made for both range and standard deviation. The smallest range and standard deviation 
values for each vector were used for future calculations. Table 2 presents each activity’s vector 
and their standard deviations. 
  
Table 2: Standard Deviation 
Activity Vector Standard Deviation 
Walking X 0.272615 
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Y 0.151893 
Z 0.407375 
Standing Up From Sitting X 0.149059089 
Y 0.109661235 
Z 0.407219629 
Sitting X 0.185340687 
Y 0.326012929 
Z 0.450997835 
Sitting Down X 0.221174625 
Y 0.363783609 
Z 0.443966194 
As one may notice, if we simply replay this data over and over, it would become obvious 
that it is fake. There are some areas where data points are exaggerated. These would be most 
obvious. However we interpreted those data values as noise when the test subject transitioned 
from one activity to another. Using this assumption those values were ignored for the calculation 
of the standard deviation for each dataset. However, even without the spikes, transmitting the 
same values every 100 or so points will be obviously fake anyway. Therefore we need to modify 
this data. 
7.1.1.2 Pseudo-random Number Generator Selection 
 Initializing the PRNG requires determining a method to randomize the accelerometer 
data. Several PRNG’s were researched; three in particular: RC4, Mersenne Twister and TinyMT. 
Since the quality of randomness wasn’t as important as minimized computational load and 
maximizing battery efficiency, first an analysis of the number of operations (assignment, 
arithmetic operations, bitwise operations such as & and bitshift) required to generate random 
numbers: 
Table 3: PRNG Operation Comparison Table 
Attribute RC4 [31] Mersenne Twister 
[32] 
TinyMT [30] 
State Memory Size 256 Byte + 40 Byte 
key 
2496 Bytes 16 bytes 
    
Operations until 1st 
number 
206 + 2844 = 3050 4364 + 8112 + 20 + 1  
= 12478 
101 + 41 = 142 
    
Operations Until 2nd 
Number 
3050 + 2844 = 5894 12478 + 20 = 12498 142 + 41 = 183 
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Operations until Nth 
number 
206 + 2844N 
+⌊(N/40)⌋*204 
4364 + 8112 + 20N + 
1 + ⌊(N/624)⌋*8112 
 
101 + 41N 
 
As you can see, the TinyMT PRNG is a clear choice given those criterion. Additionally it 
is also of high quality. It has a period of 2127, and the floating point numbers are based upon 
evenly distributed 32 bit integers [30]. Pseudo-code or implementations for each is included in 
the appendix. Using TinyMT, we can add small random offsets to the original Data. 
7.1.1.3 Modified Accelerometer Data 
Utilizing the TinyMT PRNG as well as the calculated standard deviations of each 
activity’s vector, multiple randomized number is tempered to within +- one standard deviation. 
TinyMT can return a floating point r such that 0 <= r < 1. Equation 1 can be used to temper r to 
the desired range.  
𝑟𝑟` =  (𝑟𝑟 − 0.5) ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∗ 2 
Equation 1 
Where std is the standard deviation and r` is the tempered result. 
These tempered offsets were then added to the original dataset creating a randomized, 
realistically synthesized set of data. The random offsets were needed so the same data wouldn’t 
be streamed over and over, and the spikes (noise) needed to be removed because a spike every 
constant number of data points is also suspicious. The graphs presented in Figure 10 the 
randomized vector of each activity and compares it with the original dataset:  
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 Figure 13- Modified Walking Accelerometer Data 
 The resultant offset vector has more or less the same pattern as the original data, however 
is clearly different than the original data. Meaning that this is plausibly walking data, and it never 
repeats. 
 
Figure 14: Modified Standing Up Form Sitting Accelerometer Data 
Like before the resultant offset vector is clearly the same type of accelerometer data, however the 
data values aren’t the same and don’t repeat. 
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 Figure 15: Modified Sitting Accelerometer Data 
The sitting vector is very close, as the regular pattern from the original graph would suggest. 
This zoomed in graph very tightly follows the original line (in most places, what looks like a 
spike resulted from 3 offsets for X, Y and Z that were very closed to +standard deviation). This 
very plausibly provides sitting data that doesn’t repeat. 
 
Figure 16: Modified Sitting Down Accelerometer Data 
 This graph we can conclude our offset vector does not repeat and stays consistent and in 
range within the actual activity. 
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7.1.2 Message Window 
 Going message by message and monitoring message by message delays doesn’t result in 
a very robust detection mechanism and would be prone to many false positives and false 
negatives. This is because if one packet is dropped, that is a sign there may be an attacker. There 
are also many attacks that would be missed. Instead of worrying about each message individually 
a message window is considered. 
 For the message window there is a balance of keeping track of more messages and 
therefore having more information in which to build detection mechanisms from and having 
fewer messages in the window allowing for faster detection. The mote tries to send the 
accelerometer data value every 250ms.  
In a message window, we also have to consider the possibility of packets being lost due 
to some temporary interference. With a message window of size n, k number of packets need to 
be dropped before the base station determines this to be an attacker. If we have a small window 
size n and a small k, the speed at which an attacker can be detected increases. For instance, to 
allow 4 packets to be dropped a window of 8 messages minimum would be needed, to be safe 
use a 10 message window. 
 Using this 10 message window, if we dropped 4 packets, we would know what that 5th 
packet is supposed to be when it comes in. For our purposes 4 packets in a row are acceptable, 
but the 5th one would mean there is an attacker. Figure 17 demonstrates this idea. 
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 Figure 17 - Five Packets Dropped in A Row 
This message window also protects from replay attacks, as the expected value is known, so an 
attacker cannot resend an old one. Within the message window the average delay is kept track of. 
If, within a window, the average delay get too far from 250ms, then an attacker would be 
detected. If packets are dropped, the expected delays for the missing packets are taken out from 
that delay. The attacker has a small chance spoofing an expected value in the window (1/4096 – 
the incoming value is a 12-bit ADC reading from an accelerometer). If, by chance, the attacker 
manages the expected packet, then there is no way of detecting this. But, if the attacker sends an 
unexpected packet, then an attacker would be detected. Figure 18 demonstrates this idea. 
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 Figure 18 - Attacker Window Insertion 
In this situation, while the real packet may have been dropped (so the spoofed packet wouldn’t 
be caught on the basis of delays) the spoofed packet would then be compared with the expected 
message and the attacker would be detected. 
7.2 Honeypot Detection Mechanisms 
The Honeypot started threat model; to determine the detection mechanisms required, first 
the attacks to detect had to be known. First, we first looked at the Bluetooth protocol itself. This 
yielded many attacks (mostly disconnection attacks) without any consideration of the BAN 
protocol. Then when it came to the BAN protocol itself, there were two main attack scenarios – 
spoofing the base station and spoofing a mote already in the BAN. Given the master slave nature 
of Bluetooth one cannot spoof a new mote and try to add it to the BAN, so attacks of this 
principle were not considered. 
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7.2.1 Bluetooth & Disconnection Attacks 
The Bluetooth protocol yields many attacks involving disconnecting the base station from 
the motes. Doing this would limit the amount of communication and leave the motes vulnerable 
and able to be completely hijacked, i.e. disconnected from base station. Then the attacker then 
has the ability to pair with the mote and become its new master. The illustration in Figure 11 
presents a visual explanation of this type of attack. 
 
Figure 19: Disconnection Attack 
Table 3 details the different types of disconnection attacks with a detailed description of 
how these attacks would look like. The chart also presents our method of detecting these attacks. 
Table 4: Bluetooth and Disconnection Attacks 
Bluetooth and Disconnection Attacks (Type C) 
Description of Attack Vectors Application 
Packet/Modifications to BT 
Frame 
Detection Mechanism 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Mote/Spoofed 
Base Station 
Motes/Base 
Station 
1. Bluetooth eavesdropping. 
Especially moment of pairing 
will compromise all Bluetooth 
level security. 
 
Best done with a Bluetooth 
sniffing application like 
Ubertooth. However, BT 
addresses are not actually 
globally unique which 
means you can iterate 
through the common 
address and find a non-
discoverable device [22]. 
There is generally no way to 
detect eavesdropping. 
31 
 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed 
Mote/Base 
station/Other 
Connected 
Bluetooth devices 
in BAN 
2. An attack that jams all the 
Bluetooth channels will cause 
Bluetooth devices to think 
they're disconnected and re-
initiate the pairing process. [22] 
This is done by sending 
signals on all available 
Bluetooth frequencies. 
When devices re-initiate 
pairing, an attacker can pose 
as both the base station and 
motes and have legitimate 
parties connect to the 
attacker spoofs [22]. Thus 
giving a true MIMA. 
Whenever a Blue Tooth 
device disconnects from a 
base station, its address and 
the time it disconnected is 
stored in a shared data 
structure. If there are only 2 
motes and they disconnect 
within 1 sec or else if all the 
motes disconnected within 2 
seconds, an attack is 
detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Motes in BAN 
3. An attack that sends pairing 
request packets over and over 
without follow up. 
 After entering a PIN, a 
number is generated and 
sent to the slave device to 
initiate the pairing process. 
Instantiate packet and send. 
With the default Bluetooth 
library on Android you can't 
access the part of the 
Bluetooth stack to detect 
this. 
 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Base Station 
4. Buffer overrun on the 
Bluetooth frame. This can 
overrun the Bluetooth receive 
buffer causing the app to crash. 
Using scapy, instantiate a 
Bluetooth packet called 
packet. Then use (Bluetooth 
payload) 
packet.payload.code = 
application packet. Then 
(packet length) packet.len = 
smaller than actual packet 
size. 
With the default Bluetooth 
library on Android you can't 
access the part of the 
Bluetooth stack to detect 
this. The default library was 
once vulnerable to this kind 
of attack but a bug fix was 
merged into the  
Git repository in 2013. [25] 
 
7.2.3 Targeting BS by Spoofing Motes 
 The second kind of adversary could be an attacker that is pretending to be a mote already 
in the BAN. One reason an attacker may want to do this is to confuse the base station and send 
false information around. This may cause behavior in the BAN that would be detrimental to the 
user. The illustration in Figure 12 presents a visual representation of this kind of attack.  
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Mote
Attacker spoof mote responses
Mote
Address: 003C920B48F Address: 003C920B48F
Address: 003C920B48F
Address: 003C920B48F
 
Figure 20: Spoofed Mote Attacks 
 Table 4 outlines different attacks based on spoofing motes and their detection 
mechanisms. 
Table 5: Spoofing Motes Already In Ban 
Spoofing Motes Already in BAN (Type B) 
Description of Attack Vectors Application 
Packet/Modifications to BT 
Frame 
Detection Mechanism 
Attacker  Target 
Spoofed Mote Base Station 
1. Buffer overrun attack on the 
application packet. This means 
the  Bluetooth layer would be 
unaffected, but when the 
application packet gets handed 
up it will be bigger than the 
application expected and this 
can overrun the buffer 
allowing malicious code to be 
inserted in adjacent memory to 
that used by the app. 
Header: 
0000 0000 
0001 0110 ; packet size 22 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0101 ; message ID 
Body 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
Value mappings: 
0000 0011 : Size 
0000 0010 : type ID 2's comp integer 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value name 
0100 0111 ; G 
0101 0000 ; P 
0101 0011 ; s 
0000 0000  
0000 0011 ; SIZE OF equation 
0111 0111 ; x 
0010 1010 ; * 
0011 1001 ; 9 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value units 
The size of the messages are 
known therefore any spoofed 
message that is oversized would 
be easily detectable. 
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0110 0100 ; d 
0110 0101 ; e 
0110 0111 ; g 
0000 0000 ;  null pointer beyond buffer, 
byte 23 
0000 0000 
0000 0000 
0000 0000  
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Base Station 
2. Spoof Data Inquiry response 
packets, i.e. try giving data 
conversion equations that 
divide by 0. 
Header: 
0000 0000 
0001 0110 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0101 ; message ID 
Body: 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
Value mappings: 
0000 0011 : Size 
0000 0010 : type ID 2's comp integer 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value name 
0100 0111 ; G 
0101 0000 ; P 
0101 0011 ; S 
0000 0000  
0000 0011 ; SIZE OF conversion equation 
0111 0111 ; x 
0010 1111 ; / 
0011 0000 ; 0 – conversion equation 
0000 0000 
0000 0011 ; size of value units 
0110 0100 ; d 
0110 0101 ; e 
0110 0111 ; g 
Cleanse input and conversion 
equations. As part of cleansing 
the conversion equations make 
sure to check divide by 0 and 
anything besides a 
mathematical expression. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Base Station 
3. Too many packets can make 
it so a base station is too busy 
processing incoming packets 
to control mote. DOS attacks 
such as this are known to drain 
battery life significantly. [22] 
It doesn't really matter what 
is in the packets themselves. 
It may be a good idea to 
spoof source address in the 
Bluetooth frame, but that's 
not necessary for the attack. 
Two packets received in less 
than 250 ms is obviously an 
attacker because coordinated 
messages only come every 250 
ms. 
 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Base Station 
4. Attacker transmits a 
message of type Mote Data 
sending data that is not 
plausible. This may cause bad 
information to be recorded by 
the Base station. 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001; sensor ID 
1111 1111 ; 
1111 1111; sensor data payload 
With the content of the 
messages known, any such 
message coming in with a 
different value would be from 
an attacker.  
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Motes Base Station 
5. Attacker transmits a 
message of type Mote Data 
sending data that is plausibly 
correct. This will cause 
plausibly incorrect information 
to be recorded by the BAN 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001; sensor ID 
0000 0000 
1010 1111; sensor data payload 
With the content of the 
messages known, any such 
message coming in with a 
different value would be from 
an attacker. 
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which can have differing 
consequences depending on 
the device. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Mote Base Station 
6. Spoof packets with 
incrementing sequence 
numbers in header so base 
station and mote’s sequence 
numbers become out of sync 
Packet 1: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001; sensor ID 
0000 0000 
1010 1111; sensor data payload 
Packet 2: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
0000 0001 
1010 1110; sensor data payload 
Packet 3: 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1001 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
0000 0001 ; sensor ID 
0000 0001 
1010 1111 ; sensor data payload 
In the base station 
implementation they throw out 
the sequence number. 
Documentation says otherwise.  
Therefore this needs to be 
detected (by keeping track of 
incoming sequence numbers). 
Attacker Target 
Base Station Base Station 
7. Spoof a mote response to a 
Sensor Inquiry. Giving false 
information about available 
sensors will cause the BAN to 
malfunction. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0001 ; message ID 
Body: 
0000 0001: number of Sensors 
Sensory mappings: 
0000 0001 : sensor ID 
0000 0011 : 
0000 0010 : size of sensor name 
0000 0000 
0000 0100 : size of value name 
0100 0111 : G 
0101 1001 : Y 
0101 0010 : R 
0100 1111 : O - sensory name 
 
The base station will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
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Attacker Target 
Base Station Base Station 
8. Spoof a Command Inquiry 
response packet. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0010 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general 
request 
0000 0001 : number of commands 
//Command mappings 
0000 0001 : command ID 
0000 0000 : 
0000 0100 : size of command name 
0101 0011 : S 
0101 1001 : Y 
0100 1110 : N 
0100 0011 : C – command name 
The base station will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
Attacker Target 
Base Station Base Station 
9. Spoof a Command Returns 
Inquiry response packet. 
Divide by 0 attacks or other 
false info. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : sequence number 
0000 0100 : message ID 
Body 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general 
request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
Value mappings: 
0000 0011 : Size 
0000 0010 : type ID 2's comp integer 
0000 0000 
0000 1011 : size of return name 
0111 0011 : s 
0110 0101 : e 
0110 1110 : n 
0111 0011 : s 
0110 1001 : i 
0111 0100 : t 
0110 1001 : i 
0111 0110 : v 
0110 1001 : i 
0111 0100 : t 
0111 1001: y 
0000 0000  
0000 0011 ; SIZE OF return conversion 
equation 
0111 0111 ; x 
0010 1111 ; / 
0011 0000 ; 0 – conversion equation 
0000 0000 
0000 0000 : size of value units  
The base station will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
Attacker Target 
Base Station Base Station 
10. Spoof a Command Params 
Inquiry response packet. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0011 ; message ID 
Body 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general 
request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
0000 0001 : number of parameters 
Param mappings 
0000 0010 : Parameter size 
0000 0010 : Type ID 2's comp 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : Size of param name 
The base station will know what 
the helper mote's response is 
supposed to be. If it differs an 
attack is detected. 
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0111 0011 : s 
0110 0101 : e 
0111 0100 : t 
0111 0100 : t 
0110 1001 : i 
0110 1110 : n 
0110 0111 : g – param name 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 : size of restriction set 
0011 0000 : 0 
0010 0000 : (space) 
0010 1101 : - 
0010 0000 : (space) 
0011 0101 : 5 
0000 0000 : size of parameter units 
 
 
7.2.4 Spoofing Basestation to Target Motes 
A third type of adversary is if the attacker was a spoofed base station. The base station, 
being the master in this BAN, has a lot of power and capabilities. Figure 13 presents a better 
understanding of this type of attack.  
 
Figure 21: Spoofed Base Station Attacks 
 
Table 5 shows different attacks that can be accomplished by spoofing the base station. 
 
Table 6: Spoofed Base Station Attacks 
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Spoof Base Station (Type A) 
Description of Attack 
Vectors 
Application 
Packet/Modifications to BT 
Frame 
Detection Mechanism 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Mote 
1. Learning mote commands 
and then spoofing base 
station packets to motes for 
them to execute commands. 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
1111 1111 ; message ID 
 
The helper motes should never 
receive a command.  
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Mote 
2. Sending too many packets 
can make it so a mote is too 
busy processing incoming 
packets to deal with 
legitimate communications 
with base station. DOS 
attacks such as this are 
known to drain battery life 
significantly. [22] 
It doesn't really matter what is 
in the packets themselves. It 
may be a good idea to spoof 
source address in the 
Bluetooth frame, but that's not 
necessary for the attack. 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive Message 
Mode messages. These 
messages will be encrypted so 
they will be easily 
distinguishable from spoofed 
packets. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Motes 
3. Spoof packets with 
incrementing sequence 
numbers in header so base 
station and mote’s sequence 
numbers become out of sync. 
Packet 1: 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
Packet 2: 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
Packet 3: 
0000 0000 
0000 0101 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 1001 ; sequence number 
0000 0000 ; message ID 
In the current implementation 
the motes ignore this field. 
Documentation suggested this 
field was important and used. 
Therefore this needs to be 
detected (by keeping track of 
incoming sequence numbers). 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Motes 
4. Spoof a Sensor Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0001 ; message ID 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive Message 
Mode messages. As this is not a 
Message Mode message, the 
attacker would be detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Motes 
5. Spoof a Command 
Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0010 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive Message 
Mode messages. As this is not a 
Message Mode message, the 
attacker would be detected. 
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Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Motes 
6. Spoof a Command Params 
Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0011 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive Message 
Mode messages. As this is not a 
Message Mode message, the 
attacker would be detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Motes 
7. Spoof a Data Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 ; packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 ; sequence number 
0000 0101 ; message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive Message 
Mode messages. As this is not a 
Message Mode message, the 
attacker would be detected. 
Attacker Target 
Spoofed Base 
Station 
Motes 
8. Spoof a Command Returns 
Inquiry. 
Packet 1: 
Header 
0000 0000 
0000 1000 : packet size 
0000 0000 
0000 0111 : sequence number 
0000 0100 : message ID 
0000 0000 : sensor ID 0 for general request 
0000 0001 : command ID to ask about 
 
 
After an initialization with the 
BAN PnP Protocol, the motes 
should only receive Message 
Mode messages. As this is not a 
Message Mode message, the 
attacker would be detected. 
 
 
With this honeypot model, we have all the information we need to implement the 
honeypot. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 The goal of this project was to design and implement a honeypot to add computationally 
lightweight security to a BAN. The security added by the honeypot is an alarm system that 
detects attacks. Incorporating the honeypot into a Body Area Network allows an attacker to be 
attracted and detected. The testing and results will be presented in the second edition as they are 
ongoing. Refer to the second edition of the “Wearable Honeypot” paper on the WPI library 
database for full results. 
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9 Future Works 
 The project focused on making a honeypot. Future projects could expand the features and 
detection mechanisms of the honeypot, as well as provide attacker response. Our system merely 
raises the alarm. A better system would categorize and classify attacks to gain knowledge of 
attacker abilities. These categorizations of attacks could be mapped to threat levels. Depending 
on the threat level, an appropriate action could be taken to mitigate attacker harm. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Bluetooth Background Info 
A.1.1 Device ID 
Every Bluetooth device has a device ID or Bluetooth Address which is used to identify it. 
The address is a 48-bit number just like an Ethernet MAC [26]. Unlike with an Ethernet MAC, a 
Bluetooth address is used at all levels, not just the physical one. In a piconet all devices transmit 
using the masters Bluetooth address. The Bluetooth address has 3 parts: 2 bytes for the Non-
significant Address Portion (NAP), 1 byte for Upper Address Portion (UAP), and 3 bytes for the 
Lower Addresss Portion (LAP). They are in that order MSB to LSB. While in discoverable mode 
or in use, Bluetooth addresses are always discoverable [22]. 
A.1.2 Pairing 
Before two devices can exchange data, they must be paired. Master devices initiate 
pairing by the process shown in the Figure 14.  
 
Figure 22: Bluetooth Pairing Process 
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The pairing process usually usual starts at with a user entering a PIN into a UI. The PIN 
is the basis for confirming the identity of the devices. After sending a PIN a number of keys are 
generated for Bluetooth security. The PIN is not transmitted over the wireless channel, instead it 
is used to generate a random number that becomes the basis for the authentication key. The 
initialization key is used to agree upon a link key, which depends on the type of communication 
desired. The link key is then used to generate the encryption key used for built in Bluetooth 
security [22]. The devices are officially paired at this point. 
A.1.3 Frequency Hopping 
When a Bluetooth piconet is established from a master, there 14 channels specified for 
communication. The master transmits on the seven even channels and the slaves transmit using 
the seven odd channels. Devices hop channels every 625 microseconds [27]. When 
communicating, the master and all the slaves’ user the master's device ID to determine hopping 
patter and the master's clock synchronizes the hopping pattern in the piconet. When a packet is 
being transmitted, hopping halts. After one 625 microsecond cycle if the packet is transmitted, 
then the frequency hops continue. Otherwise after 3 cycles if the packet is done channel hopping 
resumes. The maximum transmission time of a packet is only allowed to be 5 of these cycles, at 
which time frequency hopping must resume; frequency hopping may only resume after 1, 3, or 5 
cycles [27]. 
A.1.4 Bluetooth Stack 
The Bluetooth stack has 3 layers: Application, Middleware and Transport Layer. The 
application layer contains all applications on a Bluetooth ready device. The Transport Layer 
deals with both the physical and logical communication between two devices. The middle layer 
provides Bluetooth services and decides how the application layer packets get handed to the 
transport layer. This stack is depicted in Figure 15. 
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Application Layer
Middleware Layer
Transport Layer
Applications
Data
Internet Protocol
Service Discovery Protocol
RFCOMM
1. L2CAP
2. Link Manager
3. Baseband
4. RF
 
Figure 23: Bluetooth Protocol Stack 
The Application layer and the Middleware layer are a set of programs that co-mingle on those 
levels of the stack. For the transport layer however,  L2CAP (Logical Link Control and 
Adaptation) interfaces with the Link Manger which deals with the logical connection between 
devices which sits on top of the Baseband which sits on RF both of which deal with the physical 
communication. RF refers to the physical radio signals and the Baseband controls the time 
domain multiplexing of the signal. The middleware layer provides services such as TCP/IP, Data 
Transmission, Service Discover Protocol, and RFCOMM 
A.1.5 Bluetooth Security 
 Bluetooth security is meant to provide authentication, confidentiality, and authorization. 
That is verify the identity of communicating devices, maintaining communication privacy, and 
resource control by permissions. It uses a PIN for authorization (this is how authentication key is 
generated in pairing), verifying the link key is meant to verify the identity of the communication 
partner, and the encryption key is meant to keep confidentiality. 
A.1.5.1 Device ID 
 Bluetooth addresses are supposed to be globally unique like Ethernet MAC addresses. 
This is particularly important because Bluetooth uses a broadcast medium so the communication 
target must be uniquely identified. An attacker could compile a list of Bluetooth addresses, and 
use software to change their address and iterate through the list listening for packets. When it 
finds an address with packets, sniffing and packet injection become possible [22]. This kind of 
spoofing of an attacker's own address can be very useful because using standard Bluetooth 
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devices, promiscuous sniffing is not possible. This is because most Bluetooth firmware 
automatically filters out packets not meant for a particular machine [22]. Even in non-
discoverable mode Bluetooth devices will still receive packets addresses to them. 
A.1.5.2 Pairing 
 There are security issues with the paring process. The simplest of which is if this initial 
pairing communication is eavesdropped, then an attacker would have the authentication key, the 
link key, and then encryption key rendering Bluetooth level security useless. Also, PINs, which 
are used for authorization and to initiate pairing, are often left to their default values, making the 
security measure often useless. 
A.1.5.3 Frequency Hopping & Other 
 Frequency hopping provides some barrier to sniffing, but there are ways around it by 
modifying firmware or with dedicated devices. Frequency jamming attack has been documented 
to cause devices to re-initiate pairing allowing an attacker to have the legitimate devices pair 
with fake ones that provide the foundation for man in the middle attacks [22]. Even with 
frequency hopping piconets are susceptible to DOS attacks from inquiry scanning. Inquiry 
scanning is how Bluetooth devices discover each other. Messages of this type are sent over many 
frequencies. 
A.2 Development Issues 
A.2.1 Issues with Banmqp implementation 
1. Problem: Basestation crashing when motes added to BAN because inside mote 
constructor isStreaming = wasStreaming = false.  
1. Fix: When variables initialized separately bug went away 
1. Problem: Defined in his main menu where strings to hold sensor information that weren’t 
defined in his other xml files. 
1. Fix: Defined the strings 
2. Problem: In his main menu there was a closing tag as well that wasn’t open on that same 
row where those strings would have been displayed 
1. Fix: Added the needed ending tag 
3. Problem: Only had 8 sensor strings defined in the XML which means if you try to add 
beyond the fourth row you hit some sort of max in the code 
1. Fix: increasing max to what’s actually defined 
4. Problem: NULL Items grabbed in a for each loop (if there is a null element in a data 
structure, the for each construct shouldn’t process that) 
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1. Fix: Check for NULL in every for each loop 
2. Note: There were also many null pointer exceptions pertaining to trying to process 
elements in a data structure. Where the log came up null pointer checks were 
placed. 
 
A.2.2 Development Issues 
1. Never edit the source code from the motes and the basestation simultaneously in the same 
instance of Eclipse. This will cause Eclipse to throw tons and tons of errors.  
2. On the motes whenever any configuration file is changed in any way or added to the project, 
the run configuration must be redone. It will have all the same settings as before, but a new one 
must be generated or the motes will not flash. 
A.2.3 Development Best Practices 
1. Git commit as often as possible.  
2. The only simple method to get feedback from motes is the LED, use it. 
3. To get feedback from the basestation application, usb connected android phones transmit 
system activity over the USB, visible in Eclipse w/ ADT. 
4. The Shimmer manual explains how to program nesC for TinyOS better than the official 
documentation. 
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A.3 PRNGs 
A.3.1 RC4 
A.3.1.1 Flowchart 
 
A.3.1.2 Source 
[31] 
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A.3.2 Mersenne Twister 
A.3.2.1 Flowchart 
 
A.3.2.2 Source 
// Create a length 624 array to store the state of the generator 
 int[0..623] MT 
 int index = 0 
  
 // Initialize the generator from a seed 
 function initialize_generator(int seed) { 
     index := 0 
     MT[0] := seed 
     for i from 1 to 623 { // loop over each element 
         MT[i] := lowest 32 bits of(1812433253 * (MT[i-1] xor (right shift by 30 bits(MT[i-1]))) + i) // 0x6c078965 
     }  
 } 
  
 // Extract a tempered pseudorandom number based on the index-th value, 
 // calling generate_numbers() every 624 numbers 
 function extract_number() { 
     if index == 0 { 
         generate_numbers() 
     } 
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     int y := MT[index] 
     y := y xor (right shift by 11 bits(y)) 
     y := y xor (left shift by 7 bits(y) and (2636928640)) // 0x9d2c5680 
     y := y xor (left shift by 15 bits(y) and (4022730752)) // 0xefc60000 
     y := y xor (right shift by 18 bits(y)) 
 
     index := (index + 1) mod 624 
     return y 
 } 
  
 // Generate an array of 624 untempered numbers 
 function generate_numbers() { 
     for i from 0 to 623 { 
         int y := (MT[i] and 0x80000000)                       // bit 31 (32nd bit) of MT[i] 
                        + (MT[(i+1) mod 624] and 0x7fffffff)   // bits 0-30 (first 31 bits) of MT[...] 
         MT[i] := MT[(i + 397) mod 624] xor (right shift by 1 bit(y)) 
         if (y mod 2) != 0 { // y is odd 
             MT[i] := MT[i] xor (2567483615) // 0x9908b0df 
         } 
     } 
 } 
[32] 
A.3.3 TinyMT 
A.3.3.1 Flowchart 
 
A.3.3.2 Source 
#ifndef TINYMT32_H 
#define TINYMT32_H 
/** 
 * @file tinymt32.h 
 * 
 * @brief Tiny Mersenne Twister only 127 bit internal state 
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 * 
 * @author Mutsuo Saito (Hiroshima University) 
 * @author Makoto Matsumoto (University of Tokyo) 
 * 
 * Copyright (C) 2011 Mutsuo Saito, Makoto Matsumoto, 
 * Hiroshima University and The University of Tokyo. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * The 3-clause BSD License is applied to this software, see 
 * LICENSE.txt 
 */ 
 
#include <stdint.h> 
#include <inttypes.h> 
 
#define TINYMT32_MEXP 127 
#define TINYMT32_SH0 1 
#define TINYMT32_SH1 10 
#define TINYMT32_SH8 8 
#define TINYMT32_MASK UINT32_C(0x7fffffff) 
#define TINYMT32_MUL (1.0f / 4294967296.0f) 
 
#if defined(__cplusplus) 
extern "C" { 
#endif 
 
/** 
 * tinymt32 internal state vector and parameters 
 */ 
struct TINYMT32_T { 
    uint32_t status[4]; 
    uint32_t mat1; 
    uint32_t mat2; 
    uint32_t tmat; 
}; 
 
typedef struct TINYMT32_T tinymt32_t; 
 
void tinymt32_init(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t seed); 
void tinymt32_init_by_array(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t init_key[], 
       int key_length); 
 
#if defined(__GNUC__) 
/** 
 * This function always returns 127 
 * @param random not used 
 * @return always 127 
 */ 
inline static int tinymt32_get_mexp( 
    tinymt32_t * random  __attribute__((unused))) { 
    return TINYMT32_MEXP; 
} 
#else 
inline static int tinymt32_get_mexp(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    return TINYMT32_MEXP; 
} 
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#endif 
 
/** 
 * This function changes internal state of tinymt32. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 */ 
inline static void tinymt32_next_state(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t x; 
    uint32_t y; 
 
    y = random->status[3]; 
    x = (random->status[0] & TINYMT32_MASK) 
 ^ random->status[1] 
 ^ random->status[2]; 
    x ^= (x << TINYMT32_SH0); 
    y ^= (y >> TINYMT32_SH0) ^ x; 
    random->status[0] = random->status[1]; 
    random->status[1] = random->status[2]; 
    random->status[2] = x ^ (y << TINYMT32_SH1); 
    random->status[3] = y; 
    random->status[1] ^= -((int32_t)(y & 1)) & random->mat1; 
    random->status[2] ^= -((int32_t)(y & 1)) & random->mat2; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs 32-bit unsigned integer from internal state. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return 32-bit unsigned pseudorandom number 
 */ 
inline static uint32_t tinymt32_temper(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t t0, t1; 
    t0 = random->status[3]; 
#if defined(LINEARITY_CHECK) 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 ^ (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#else 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 + (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#endif 
    t0 ^= t1; 
    t0 ^= -((int32_t)(t1 & 1)) & random->tmat; 
    return t0; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (1.0 <= r < 2.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_temper_conv(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t t0, t1; 
    union { 
 uint32_t u; 
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 float f; 
    } conv; 
 
    t0 = random->status[3]; 
#if defined(LINEARITY_CHECK) 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 ^ (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#else 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 + (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#endif 
    t0 ^= t1; 
    conv.u = ((t0 ^ (-((int32_t)(t1 & 1)) & random->tmat)) >> 9) 
       | UINT32_C(0x3f800000); 
    return conv.f; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * Users should not call this function directly. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (1.0 < r < 2.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_temper_conv_open(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    uint32_t t0, t1; 
    union { 
 uint32_t u; 
 float f; 
    } conv; 
 
    t0 = random->status[3]; 
#if defined(LINEARITY_CHECK) 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 ^ (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#else 
    t1 = random->status[0] 
 + (random->status[2] >> TINYMT32_SH8); 
#endif 
    t0 ^= t1; 
    conv.u = ((t0 ^ (-((int32_t)(t1 & 1)) & random->tmat)) >> 9) 
       | UINT32_C(0x3f800001); 
    return conv.f; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs 32-bit unsigned integer from internal state. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return 32-bit unsigned integer r (0 <= r < 2^32) 
 */ 
inline static uint32_t tinymt32_generate_uint32(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper(random); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
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 * This function is implemented using multiplying by 1 / 2^32. 
 * floating point multiplication is faster than using union trick in 
 * my Intel CPU. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 <= r < 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_float(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random);  
    return tinymt32_temper(random) * TINYMT32_MUL;  
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function is implemented using union trick. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (1.0 <= r < 2.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_float12(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper_conv(random); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function is implemented using union trick. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 <= r < 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_float01(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper_conv(random) - 1.0f; 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function may return 1.0 and never returns 0.0. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 < r <= 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_floatOC(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return 1.0f - tinymt32_generate_float(random); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function outputs floating point number from internal state. 
 * This function returns neither 0.0 nor 1.0. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 < r < 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static float tinymt32_generate_floatOO(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper_conv_open(random) - 1.0f; 
} 
 
/** 
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 * This function outputs double precision floating point number from 
 * internal state. The returned value has 32-bit precision. 
 * In other words, this function makes one double precision floating point 
 * number from one 32-bit unsigned integer. 
 * @param random tinymt internal status 
 * @return floating point number r (0.0 < r <= 1.0) 
 */ 
inline static double tinymt32_generate_32double(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    return tinymt32_temper(random) * (1.0 / 4294967296.0); 
} 
 
#if defined(__cplusplus) 
} 
#endif 
#endif 
 
/** 
 * @file tinymt32.c 
 * 
 * @brief Tiny Mersenne Twister only 127 bit internal state 
 * 
 * @author Mutsuo Saito (Hiroshima University) 
 * @author Makoto Matsumoto (The University of Tokyo) 
 * 
 * Copyright (C) 2011 Mutsuo Saito, Makoto Matsumoto, 
 * Hiroshima University and The University of Tokyo. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * The 3-clause BSD License is applied to this software, see 
 * LICENSE.txt 
 */ 
#include "tinymt32.h" 
#define MIN_LOOP 8 
#define PRE_LOOP 8 
 
/** 
 * This function represents a function used in the initialization 
 * by init_by_array 
 * @param x 32-bit integer 
 * @return 32-bit integer 
 */ 
static uint32_t ini_func1(uint32_t x) { 
    return (x ^ (x >> 27)) * UINT32_C(1664525); 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function represents a function used in the initialization 
 * by init_by_array 
 * @param x 32-bit integer 
 * @return 32-bit integer 
 */ 
static uint32_t ini_func2(uint32_t x) { 
    return (x ^ (x >> 27)) * UINT32_C(1566083941); 
} 
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/** 
 * This function certificate the period of 2^127-1. 
 * @param random tinymt state vector. 
 */ 
static void period_certification(tinymt32_t * random) { 
    if ((random->status[0] & TINYMT32_MASK) == 0 && 
 random->status[1] == 0 && 
 random->status[2] == 0 && 
 random->status[3] == 0) { 
 random->status[0] = 'T'; 
 random->status[1] = 'I'; 
 random->status[2] = 'N'; 
 random->status[3] = 'Y'; 
    } 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function initializes the internal state array with a 32-bit 
 * unsigned integer seed. 
 * @param random tinymt state vector. 
 * @param seed a 32-bit unsigned integer used as a seed. 
 */ 
void tinymt32_init(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t seed) { 
    random->status[0] = seed; 
    random->status[1] = random->mat1; 
    random->status[2] = random->mat2; 
    random->status[3] = random->tmat; 
    int i; 
    for (i = 1; i < MIN_LOOP; i++) { 
 random->status[i & 3] ^= i + UINT32_C(1812433253) 
     * (random->status[(i - 1) & 3] 
        ^ (random->status[(i - 1) & 3] >> 30)); 
    } 
    period_certification(random); 
    for (i = 0; i < PRE_LOOP; i++) { 
 tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    } 
} 
 
/** 
 * This function initializes the internal state array, 
 * with an array of 32-bit unsigned integers used as seeds 
 * @param random tinymt state vector. 
 * @param init_key the array of 32-bit integers, used as a seed. 
 * @param key_length the length of init_key. 
 */ 
void tinymt32_init_by_array(tinymt32_t * random, uint32_t init_key[], 
       int key_length) { 
    const int lag = 1; 
    const int mid = 1; 
    const int size = 4; 
    int i, j; 
    int count; 
    uint32_t r; 
    uint32_t * st = &random->status[0]; 
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    st[0] = 0; 
    st[1] = random->mat1; 
    st[2] = random->mat2; 
    st[3] = random->tmat; 
    if (key_length + 1 > MIN_LOOP) { 
 count = key_length + 1; 
    } else { 
 count = MIN_LOOP; 
    } 
    r = ini_func1(st[0] ^ st[mid % size] 
    ^ st[(size - 1) % size]); 
    st[mid % size] += r; 
    r += key_length; 
    st[(mid + lag) % size] += r; 
    st[0] = r; 
    count--; 
    for (i = 1, j = 0; (j < count) && (j < key_length); j++) { 
 r = ini_func1(st[i % size] 
        ^ st[(i + mid) % size] 
        ^ st[(i + size - 1) % size]); 
 st[(i + mid) % size] += r; 
 r += init_key[j] + i; 
 st[(i + mid + lag) % size] += r; 
 st[i % size] = r; 
 i = (i + 1) % size; 
    } 
    for (; j < count; j++) { 
 r = ini_func1(st[i % size] 
        ^ st[(i + mid) % size] 
        ^ st[(i + size - 1) % size]); 
 st[(i + mid) % size] += r; 
 r += i; 
 st[(i + mid + lag) % size] += r; 
 st[i % size] = r; 
 i = (i + 1) % size; 
    } 
    for (j = 0; j < size; j++) { 
 r = ini_func2(st[i % size] 
        + st[(i + mid) % size] 
        + st[(i + size - 1) % size]); 
 st[(i + mid) % size] ^= r; 
 r -= i; 
 st[(i + mid + lag) % size] ^= r; 
 st[i % size] = r; 
 i = (i + 1) % size; 
    } 
    period_certification(random); 
    for (i = 0; i < PRE_LOOP; i++) { 
 tinymt32_next_state(random); 
    } 
} 
 
 
 
/* This one was changed for our purposes 
 * main.c 
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 */ 
/** 
 * @file check32.c 
 * 
 * @brief Simple check program for tinymt32 
 * 
 * @author Mutsuo Saito (Hiroshima University) 
 * @author Makoto Matsumoto (The University of Tokyo) 
 * 
 * Copyright (C) 2011 Mutsuo Saito, Makoto Matsumoto, 
 * Hiroshima University and University of Tokyo. 
 * All rights reserved. 
 * 
 * The 3-clause BSD License is applied to this software, see 
 * LICENSE.txt 
 */ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdint.h> 
#include <inttypes.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include "tinymt32.h" 
 
int main(int argc, char * argv[]) { 
    tinymt32_t tinymt; 
    tinymt.mat1 = (uint32_t) 0xEFEFEFEF; 
    tinymt.mat2 = (uint32_t) 0x12345678; 
    tinymt.tmat = (uint32_t) 0xABCDEF12; 
    uint32_t seed = 0x1321FBCA; 
    tinymt32_init(&tinymt, seed); 
    tinymt32_generate_floatOC(&tinymt); // float between 0 and 1; 
    return 0; 
} 
 
 
[30] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
